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PuBLic OFFICERS - ToRT LIABILITY FOR Acrs oF NoNFEASANCE AND
MISFEASANCE - Deceased was killed in a boxing match, death being largely
the result of aggravated pneumonia, which had been contracted unknowingly
two days before the bout. The alien father of the young boxer sought damages,
for his son's wrongful death, from one member of the state athletic commission
and its chief inspector. The theory of plaintiff's claim was that the officers were
individually liable because of breach of their common-law and statutory duties
to see that the boxer was given a proper physical examination before the fight.
Held, on granting defendant's motion to dismiss, that the law imposed no duty
on the defendant officers to the deceased or his survivors. Shelaeff 'U. Groves,
(D. C. Cal. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 1018.
Recent cases seem to bear out long-existing principles as to tort liability
of ministerial officers for acts of nonfeasance and misfeasance. Beyond the
common-law duty which the law imposes on one to act carefully once one

1940]

RECENT DECISIONS

assumes to act are the duties of office which arise almost exclusively from statute.1
If an officer's duty be to an individual, and the breach of that duty injure that
person, the officer is personally liable. 2 Breach of a duty to the public may lead to
an action against the officer by the governmental unit representing the public.8
Whether the duty is to the public or to private individuals cannot always be
determined by looking at the statute creating the office. The answer to this
question of duty has often been based on the type of negligent act of which the
officer has been guilty. For affirmative negligence or misfeasance, the courts say
quite generally that officers are liable to any person injured thereby.' If the
officer has been guilty of negligent inaction or nonfeasance, only those specially
injured may recover.G Fundamentally, however, whether the duty is owed to
the individual or the public has been made to depend on certain factors of policy.
The suggestion has been made that if officers were held liable to individuals for
every negligent act committed by them, capable men would not accept public
office.0 Remembering that the officer has affirmatively accepted a position of
1 "Many public duties, however, are wholly created by special statutes. In such
cases it is not an universal proposition that a breach of such duty confers a right of
action on any and every person who suffers particular damage from it. The extent of
the liabilities incident to a statutory duty must be ascertained from the scope and
terms of the statute itself." l PoLLOCK, ToRTS, 13th ed., 26 (1929).
2 Hipp v. Ferrell, 173 N. C. 167, 91 S. E. 831 (1917); 2 CooLEY, ToRTS,
4th ed., 386 (1932). In Walker v. Broderick, 141 Misc. 391, 252 N. Y. S. 559
( 193 I), the duty of a state bank examiner was held to extend to the public and not
to the stockholders of an insolvent bank. State ex rel. Funk v. Turner, 328 Mo. 604,
42 S. W. (2d) 594 (1931), on the other hand, seems to grant the bank examiner's
duty to individual depositors of banks.
·
8 State v. Conley, l 18 W. Va. 508, 190 S. E. 908 (1937); Avery County v.
Braswell, 215 N. C. 270, l S. E. (2d) 864 (1939). In an action by a tax collector
i.gainst the state auditor in Gully v. White, 167 Miss. 691, 146 So. 852 (1933), it was
held that a penal statute gave no right to an action in tort.
4 First Nat. Bank of Key West v. Filer, 107 Fla. 526, 145 So. 204, 87 A. L. R.
267 at 273 (1933); Wolfson v. Wheeler, 130 Cal. App. 475, 19 P. (2d) 1004
(1933); Silva v. MacAuley, (Cal. App. 1933) 26 P. (2d) 887, 27 P. (2d) 791;
Hester v. Sanderson, (La. App. 1937) 172 So. 565; Lenth v. Schug, (Iowa, 1938)
281 N. W. 510, 287 N. W. 596; Wynn v. Gandy, 170 Va. 590, 197 S. E. 527
(1938).
GIn Richards v. Tynes, 149 Okla. 235, 300 P. 297 (1931), a clerk of court was
held not liable to a purchaser of real estate who was wrongly levied on as a result of
the officer's failure to docket a judgment. The plaintiff did not have the "special and
direct" interest in the clerk's performance of duty to recover for his failure to act.
See also: MECHEM, PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICERS 445 (1890); Homer v. Terpin,
63 S. D. 309, 258 N. W. 140 (1934); Moffitt v. Davis, 205 N. C. 565, 172 S. E.
317 (1934); 'Svenson v. Brix, 156 Ore. 236, 64 P. (2d) 830 (1937); Campbell
County v. Ridenour, 22 Tenn. App. 250, 120 S. W. (2d) 1000 (1938).
8 In Smith v. Zimmer, 45 Mont. 282 at 303, 12-5 P. 420 (1912), Smith, J.,
said in reference to this policy argument, "I respectfully protest against such an argument being employed to influence a court in its determination of an important question
of law. The fundamental law of a state is not to be changed or misconstrued out of
consideration for an individual who may be adversely affected by his violation of it."
Decision notes in So UNiv. PA. L. REv. 464 (1932) and 30 MICH. L. REV. 808
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public trust, 7 and that he has only the duty to perform those duties with reasonabie care,8 it might be said that the officer's duty should depend largely upon
what persons or class of persons the statute creating his office intended to
benefit.9 In determining whether the legislature intended personal tort liability
of officers to individuals, the larger interests of the public of course cannot be
forgotten. But some test, such as the one suggested, should be furnished to give
some concrete basis on which to predicate the officer's duty in all cases. In the
principal case, the California Boxing and Wrestling Act 10 was aimed primarily
at protecting participants in public prize fights and wrestling matches. Although
the statute does seem to place the duty of supervising physical examinations primarily on the promoters and sponsors of a fight,11 it seems that the defendant
chief inspector, at least, might have been held liable because of his duty to see
that all of the statutory rules were strictly carried out.12

(1932) on Walker v. Broderick, 141 Misc. 391, 252 N. Y. S. 559 (1931), seem to
favor the policy argument as a basis for liability. But Ethridge, J., dissenting in State
ex rel. Bank of Commerc_e & Trust Co. v. Forbes, 179 Miss. 1, 174 So. 67 (1937),
would hold the individual members of a board of supervisors liable to the assignees of
county loan warrants for failure to levy a tax to pay those warrants as the statute
required. It was urged that the policy in strengthening state credit and making officers
carry out their duties should be considered paramount to other policy considerations.
1 HARPER, ToRTS 197 (1933). In distinguishing between nonfeasance and misfeasance, the author stresses that liability for the former arises where one voluntarily
places himself in a particular relationship to others by some anterior act.
8 Smith v. Zimmer, 45 Mont. 282, 125 P. 420 (1912); State ex rel. Funk v.
Turner, 328 Mo. 604, 42 S. W. (2d) 594 (1931); First Nat. Bank of Key West
v•. Filer, 107 Fla. 526, 145 So. 204 (1933).
9 Walker v. Broderick, 141 Misc. 391, 252 N. Y. S. 559 (1931); Avery County
v. Braswell, 215 N. C. 270, 1 S. E. (2d) 864 (1939). This same principle of determining tort liability under a statute was set out by Cardozo, C. J., in Moch Co.
v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. 160, 159 N. E. 896 (1928).
1 ° Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1937), Act 6129.
11 Ibid., § 11 (b).
12 Ibid., § 9.

